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Objective. Several studies have reported that people with Parkinson’s disease (PD) perform poorly on tests of ‘*eory of Mind’
(ToM), suggesting impairment in the ability to understand and infer other people’s thoughts and feelings. However, few studies
have sought to separate the processes involved in social reasoning from those involved in managing the inhibitory demands on
these tests. In this study, we investigated the contribution of inhibition to ToM performance in PD.Methods. 18 PD patients and 22
age-matched healthy controls performed a ToM test that separates the ability to infer someone else’s perspective from the ability to
inhibit one’s own. Participants also completed a battery of standard measures of social and executive functioning, including
measures of inhibition. Results. *e PD patients performed worse on the ToM test only when the inhibitory demands were high.
When the level of inhibition required was reduced, there were no signiﬁcant group diﬀerences. Furthermore, executive im-
pairments in PD patients were limited to measures of inhibition, with disadvantages associated with poorer ToM performance in
this group. Conclusions. *is study provides convincing evidence that the apparent impairment observed on ToM tests in PD is
explained by deﬁcits in inhibition.
1. Introduction
Several studies have reported that people with Parkinson’s
disease (PD) perform poorly on tests assessing the ability to
infer the beliefs, desires, and intentions of others [1–3].
*ese functions fall under the umbrella term of “*eory of
Mind” (ToM), considered essential for the development and
maintenance of successful social relationships [4].
ToM has been separated into cognitive and aﬀective
components [5]. Cognitive ToM is the ability to identify
others’ beliefs and intentions, and aﬀective ToM is the ability
to empathise with others’ emotional states. In PD, there are
reports of impairments in both [1, 2], but these have been
inconsistent [6–8], with some reporting impairment only in
cognitive ToM [7–11] or advanced disease [8]. *e variation
in results appears to depend upon the speciﬁc measure used
and severity of PD in the cohort tested [12]. *is would
suggest that the incidental processing demands of the in-
dividual tests may be contributing to the observed variation.
*is variation may be, at least in part, explained by the
varying demands that each test places upon executive
function. Although the precise role of executive function in
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performance on ToM tests remains debated, some have
argued that ToM is simply the reﬂection of “domain-gen-
eral” executive functions within a social realm [13]. Alter-
native accounts have construed ToM as a specialised process,
involving dedicated or “domain-speciﬁc” ToM computa-
tions, distinct from executive functions [14–16]. Others still
have suggested that performance on ToM tests involves both
domain-general executive functions and domain-speciﬁc
ToM processes [17].
*ere are reports of a double dissociation between ToM
and executive functions: impaired ToM with preserved
executive functions [14, 18, 19] and preserved ToM with
impaired executive functions [20, 21], suggesting separa-
bility of function. However, this apparent independencemay
betray an insuﬃciently broad assessment of the range of
functions underpinned by executive control [22]. In par-
ticular, there is mounting evidence to suggest that the ex-
ecutive function of inhibition is crucial for performance on
ToM tests. Several studies have found inhibition to be highly
correlated with and predictive of performance on ToM tests
in children [23–25] and adults [26]. In keeping with this,
closer inspection of the aforementioned reports of preserved
ToM with impaired executive functions reveals that this
occurred in the presence of intact performance the Stroop
Colour Word Test of inhibition [20] or in the absence of any
measure of inhibition [21].
Samson and colleagues [27, 28] argue that standard tests
of ToM lack the capacity to identify the speciﬁc cognitive
function underlying impaired performance. For example, a
canonical test of ToM is the “false belief” test. During this
test, participants are asked to listen to a story in which a
character hides an object and then leaves the room. When
this character is outside of the room, a second character
moves the hidden object to a new location. Participants are
then asked where the ﬁrst character will think the object is.
Samson and colleagues argue that in order to answer this
question correctly, participants must ﬁrst inhibit their own
knowledge of where the object is (self-perspective) in order
to focus on the ﬁrst character’s false belief (other-
perspective). *is necessitates high demands upon atten-
tional and inhibitory functions.
*e neuropsychological proﬁle of PD is characterised
by deﬁcits in attentional and executive function, most
notably in inhibition [29–33]. Speed of processing is also
reduced [34–36]. As PD progresses, other cognitive do-
mains become increasing aﬀected, with additional im-
pairments in memory and visual processing [37, 38]. *us,
it remains unclear how much of the apparent impairment
on ToM tests in PD may be explained by deﬁcits in more
general cognitive abilities, and particularly the executive
function of inhibition.
*e aim of the current study is to assess ToM abilities in
PD when controlling for incidental inhibitory demands. In
order to do this, we designed a false belief test based upon
that described by Samson and colleagues [27, 28, 39], which
directly manipulates the level of inhibition involved. In
addition, we also assessed participants on standard ToM and
cognitive tests, including several measures of executive
functioning, including inhibition, and measures of mood, in
order to investigate the relationship between these and
performance on the experimental measure.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants. A total of 18 patients with idiopathic PD
and 22 healthy age-matched controls took part in this study.
All patients were recruited from the National Hospital for
Neurology and Neurosurgery, Queen Square, London. All
fulﬁlled Queen Square Brain Bank criteria for PD and had no
diagnosis of dementia. All patients were receiving dopa-
minergic medication and tested under their usual medica-
tion conditions. *e healthy controls were recruited
amongst patients’ spouses or relatives or through local
advertisement. No participant had signiﬁcant neurological
or psychiatric history. *e characteristics of the two groups
are shown in Table 1.
*e research was done in accordance with the Helsinki
declaration and the Institute of Neurology Joint Research
Ethics Committee UCLH, NHS Trust Research and De-
velopment Directorate.
2.2. Procedure. All of the patients and healthy controls
completed the following assessments.
2.2.1. ToM Test: High and Low Inhibition Conditions.
*is test was adapted from Samson and colleagues
[27, 28, 39]. In our version, participants completed 12 trials
in each condition (high and low inhibition), presented in a
pseudorandomized order. *e high inhibition condition is
similar to a classical false belief test. Here, the participant is
shown a woman seeing an object placed inside one of three
identical boxes. She leaves the room and in her absence, the
location of the boxes is swapped. *e woman then returns,
and the participant is asked where she will look for the
object. In order to answer correctly, the participant must not
only infer the woman’s false belief but also inhibit their own
perspective of knowing the true location of the object.
In the low inhibition condition, the participant sees the
woman looking inside the three boxes but is not shown
which of the boxes contains the object. *e woman then
leaves the room, and as before, the location of the boxes is
swapped. *e woman then returns and oﬀers the participant
a clue about the location of the object by pointing to one of
the boxes. *e participant is then asked where she will look
for the object. In order to answer correctly, the participant
must infer the woman’s false belief to choose the box she has
selected. Crucially, in this condition, the participant does not
have to inhibit knowledge of the object’s true location. *us,
for each trial, the participant is asked where the woman will
look for the object, assessing the participant’s ability to infer
a false belief. *e participant is also asked where is the true
location of the object, as a control measure to assess
comprehension.
We modiﬁed the original test in two ways. Firstly, the
original videos used only young actors. As there is evidence
of an ”own-age bias” in face processing [40–42], the videos
were re-shot to include older actors. Secondly, as the original
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test involved choosing between only two boxes, it invoked a
binary response choice and required a great number of trials
per condition to reduce the inﬂuence of chance, with an
administration time of at least two hours. In the present
study, the number of boxes was increased to three, allowing a
reduction in the number of trials and administration time.
When the correct answer could have been one of two
possible locations, a response indicating either or both lo-
cations was accepted. Each question therefore had a max-
imum possible score of 12.
2.2.2. Standard Measures of ToM and Social Cognition.
ToM was assessed using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes
Test, Revised Version (RMET; [43]). On this test, partici-
pants were shown the eye regions of actors and asked to
identify their mental state from one of the four possible
responses. Social cognition was also assessed using the
Ekman 60 Faces [44]. Participants were shown the faces of 10
actors and asked to identify the emotion expressed from one
of six possible responses: happiness, sadness, disgust, fear,
surprise, and anger.
2.2.3. Executive Functioning. Executive functioning was
assessed using measures of attentional ﬂexibility, updating of
information in working memory, and inhibition of pre-
potent responses respectively. Attentional ﬂexibility, or
set-shifting, was assessed using the Plus/Minus test [45] and
the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test [46]. Updating of in-
formation in working memory was assessed using the Digit
Span subtest from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale,
*ird Edition (WAIS-III; [47]). Inhibition of prepotent
responses was assessed using the Stroop Colour Word Test
[48], the Hayling Sentence Completion Test [46], and the
Elevator Counting with Distraction subtest from the Test of
Everyday Attention [49]. In addition, measures of phonemic
(FAS; [50]) and semantic (animals; [50]) verbal ﬂuency were
also used.
2.2.4. Background Cognitive Tests. Other cognitive tests
administered included the Story subtests from the Adult
Memory and Information Processing Battery [51] and the
Symbol Digit Modalities Test [52].
2.2.5. Mood. Mood state was assessed using the Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; [53]) and Apathy
Evaluation Scale (AES; [54]).
2.3. Statistical Analysis. Mean and standard deviations were
calculated for each of the variables. Normality of distribution
was assessed using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test and, if
signiﬁcant, by examining the z-scores for skewness and
kurtosis. Homogeneity of variance was assessed using
Levene’s test. Unless otherwise stated, all data met the as-
sumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance. It was
not possible to conduct a mixed analysis of variance because
of insuﬃcient homogeneity of variance despite square root
transformation. *erefore, scores were compared between
groups using t-tests for related samples and independent t-
tests, or Wilcoxon signed-ranks and Mann–Whitney ana-
lyses, as appropriate, corrected for multiple comparisons.
Scores were also analysed using Pearson’s correlational,
principal components, and multiple regression analyses to
explore the relationships between performance on measures
of ToM and executive functioning, corrected for multiple
comparisons where appropriate. All tests were conducted
using IBM SPSS Statistics Data Editor version 24.
3. Results
3.1. Participants. *e two groups were matched in age (t
(28.38)�−0.01, p � 0.09), gender (χ2 (1)� 0.85, p � 0.27),
and NART Predicted Full Scale IQ (t (37)� 0.77, p � 0.45).
3.2. ToM Test: High and Low Inhibition Conditions. Mean
performance on the ToM test in the two groups is shown in
Table 2.
3.2.1. False Belief Test. As shown in Figure 1, Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests revealed that the PD patients performed
worse in the high inhibition condition than in the low in-
hibition condition (Z�−2.40, p< 0.05). *ere was no such
diﬀerence in the healthy controls (Z�−0.91, p � 0.37).
Mann–Whitney tests revealed that the PD patients
performed signiﬁcantly worse than the healthy controls on
the false belief test in the high inhibition condition
(U� 57.00, p< 0.001). *ere were no signiﬁcant group
diﬀerences in the low inhibition condition (U� 153.00,
p � 0.60).
3.2.2. True Location Test. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests also
revealed that both groups performed worse on the true
location test in the low inhibition condition than in the high
inhibition condition (age-matched: Z�−3.13, p< 0.01; PD:
Z�−2.74, p< 0.01).
Table 1: Characteristics of PD patients and healthy controls.
PD patients (n� 18) Age-matched controls (n� 22)
Gender (male) 10, 55.6% 9, 40.9%
Age (years) 63.83± 10.73 63.81± 7.09
NART predicted IQ 117.94± 6.64 119.41± 5.33
Age of onset (years) 57.56± 10.70 —
Duration of illness (years) 6.11± 3.07 —
Dopamine dosage (mg) 655.15± 450.34 —
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Mann–Whitney tests revealed that the PD patients
performed signiﬁcantly worse than the healthy controls on
the true location test in the high inhibition condition
(U� 88.50, p< 0.01). *ere were no signiﬁcant group dif-
ferences in the low inhibition condition (U� 124.00,
p � 0.69).
3.3. Standard Measures of ToM, Social Cognition, and Exec-
utive Function. Mean scores on the standard measures of
ToM, social cognition, and executive function are reported
in Table 3.
Independent t-tests revealed no signiﬁcant group dif-
ferences in performance on the Ekman (t (36)�−0.96,
p � 0.34). However, PD patients performed signiﬁcantly
worse than the healthy controls on the RMET test (t (37)�
3.15, p< 0.01). *e PD group also performed signiﬁcantly
worse on one measure of executive functioning only,
namely, the Hayling (t (27.63)� 14.13, p< 0.01).
3.4. Background Cognitive Tests and Mood. Scores on the
background cognitive tests and measures of mood are re-
ported in Table 4.
Independent t-tests revealed that the PD patients per-
formed signiﬁcantly worse than healthy controls on both
AMIPB immediate (t (35)� 3.85, p< 0.001) and delayed
story recall (t (32.64)� 3.08, p< 0.01). *ere were no other
signiﬁcant group diﬀerences. *ere were no signiﬁcant
group diﬀerences in mood scores.
3.5. Relationship between ToM and PD Disease Characteristics.
Pearson correlations were conducted to investigate the re-
lationship between the PD patients’ performance on the
ToM test and their PD disease characteristics (dopamine
dosage and disease duration). *is revealed that higher
dopamine dosages were associated with poorer performance
in the high inhibition condition of the false belief test
(r�−0.50, p< 0.05). *ere were no other signiﬁcant
associations.
3.6. Relationship between ToM and Executive Functioning.
A principal components analysis with varimax rotation was
also conducted to determine the relationship between the
performance on the false belief test and measures of exec-
utive function. As shown in Table 5, this analysis extracted
four independent factors. *e ﬁrst factor comprised scores
on tests tapping inhibitory functions, namely, the false belief
test in the high inhibition condition, the Stroop, Hayling,
and Elevator Counting with Distraction tests, as well as the
Brixton and both measures of verbal ﬂuency to a lesser
extent. *e second factor reﬂected primarily working
memory, with performance on the False Belief test in the low
inhibition condition, Digit Span, and the Brixton and FAS
ﬂuency to lesser extents. *e third factor only involved the
set-shifting test of Plus/Minus ratio, whereas the fourth
factor reﬂected its associations with the False Belief test in
the low inhibition condition and verbal ﬂuency.
Pearson correlations were also conducted to explore
further the relationship between ToM and executive func-
tioning. *ese revealed that performance on the false belief
test in high inhibition condition correlated with perfor-
mance on the Hayling (r� 0.52, p< 0.01) and Elevator
Counting with Distraction tests only (r� .61, p< 0.001).
Performance in the low inhibition condition was not as-
sociated with performance on any measures of inhibition or
executive function. *ere were also no signiﬁcant correla-
tions between performance on the object location control
test in either condition and performance on any measure of
executive functioning.
Multiple regression analysis revealed that performance
on the Hayling and Elevator Counting with Distraction tests
was a signiﬁcant predictor of performance on the False Belief
Table 2: Performance on the ToM test in the two groups (mean± SD).
Test Condition PD patients (n� 18) Healthy controls (n� 22)
False belief High inhibition 8.78± 2.53 11.55± 0.69∗∗Low inhibition 11.06± 1.83 11.68± 0.58
True location High inhibition 10.11± 1.64 11.52± 0.68∗Low inhibition 7.56± 2.94 9.19 2.34∗p< 0.01; ∗∗p< 0.001.
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Figure 1: Performance on the ToM test in high and low inhibition
conditions in the two groups.
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test in the high inhibition condition (F2,27 �10.28,
p< 0.001). Together, the two tests accounted for 39.0% of the
variance.
4. Discussion
*e current study found that patients with PD performed
signiﬁcantly worse than age-matched healthy controls on
two measures of ToM: our ToM test and RMET. At ﬁrst
glance, this ﬁnding lends support to the suggestion that, in
PD, there is an underlying deﬁcit in the ability to infer the
beliefs, desires, and intentions of other people, consistent
with other studies [1, 2] [7–9, 11, 12]. However, the main aim
of the present study was to determine how much of this
apparent impairment may be explained by the incidental
processing demands that ToM tests incur, most notably in
inhibition. Full neuropsychological testing revealed that the
PD patients demonstrated impairment in executive func-
tions and speciﬁcally in inhibition. Although PD patients
demonstrated lower scores on all tests of executive functions,
performance was only signiﬁcantly reduced on one test of
inhibition: the Hayling. *is supports previous ﬁndings that
PD is characterised by deﬁcits in executive function and
particularly inhibition [29–33]. Strikingly, when we ma-
nipulated our ToM test to reduce the level of inhibition
required, there were no longer any group diﬀerences in
performance. Further analyses also revealed that perfor-
mance on the high inhibition condition of the ToM test was
negatively correlated with greater impairment on measures
of inhibition and, indeed, performance on the ToM test was
predicted by performance on measures of inhibition. Fur-
thermore, factor analysis conﬁrmed that performance on the
high and low inhibition conditions dissociated, with per-
formance on the high inhibition condition loading upon
inhibition, whereas performance on the low inhibition
condition loaded upon working memory.
*ese ﬁndings suggest that, in PD, there is no impairment
in ToM per se but rather the executive functions that support
performance on ToM tests are diminished: deﬁcits in in-
hibition underlie the impairment in ToM. *is ﬁnding may
help explain the inconsistency observed on tests of social
cognition in both the current and previous studies. For ex-
ample, although patients performed poorly on the RMETand
the experimental measure of ToM, there were no signiﬁcant
group diﬀerences in recognising facial emotional expressions
on the Ekman. Emotion recognition is thought to be a close
correlate of social cognition [55] and impaired performance
which is a diagnostic marker of frontotemporal dementia
[56]. *e preservation of emotion recognition aﬃrms our
ﬁnding that deﬁcits in social cognition are not constitutional
to PD, but rather reﬂect the incidental demands of the tests
used. One previous study that reported emotion recognition
deﬁcits found, rather counterintuitively, performance to be
worse in those with less advanced PD, but who were un-
medicated at time of testing [57]. Other studies have also
Table 5: Principal component analysis (with varimax rotation) for
underlying factors on tests of executive function and false belief.
Factor
1
Factor
2
Factor
3
Factor
4
False belief—high inhibition 0.81
False belief—low inhibition 0.67 0.52
Stroop—total 0.81
Hayling—overall score 0.77
Elevator counting with
distraction 0.82
Plus/minus ratio 0.80 0.44
Brixton—overall score 0.67 0.47
Digit span:
forwards—backwards 0.65
FAS—total 0.45 −0.58 0.42
Animals—total 0.61 0.42
Table 3: Performance on the standard measures of ToM, social cognition, and executive functioning in the two groups (mean± SD).
PD patients (n� 18) Healthy controls (n� 22)
Social Ekman 49.42± 5.34 47.91± 4.30
Cognition RMET 23.59± 3.28 26.77± 3.01∗
Inhibition
Stroop—total 85.83± 19.49 91.53± 17.83
Hayling—total scaled score 16.35± 2.12 18.70± 1.22∗
Elevator counting with distraction 7.65± 3.02 8.94± 1.21
Set-shifting Plus/Minus ratio 1.38± 0.27 1.43± 0.17Brixton—overall score 4.44± 2.50 4.95± 2.54
Updating Digit span: forwards and backwards 7.65± 3.02 8.94± 1.21
Fluency FAS—total 40.00± 14.25 40.95± 10.80Animals—total 19.06± 4.25 21.60± 2.58∗p< 0.01; RMET: reading the mind in the eyes test, revised version.
Table 4: Performance on the background cognitive tests and mood
assessments in the two groups (mean± SD).
PD patients
(n� 18)
Healthy controls
(n� 22)
AMIPB story
immediate 27.94± 7.23 38.80± 9.51∗∗
AMIPB story delayed 24.00± 6.94 34.29± 12.22∗
AMIPB story retained 85.49± 9.76 90.41± 9.05
SDMT 40.12± 8.37 44.71± 5.82
HADS—anxiety 7.53± 3.64 5.19± 3.23
HADS—depression 4.00± 2.30 3.52± 2.80
Apathy 25.67± 3.37 24.50± 5.61∗p< 0.01; ∗∗p< 0.001. AMIPB: Adult Memory and Information Processing
Battery; SDMT: Symbol Digit Modalities Test; HADS: Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale.
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shown little correlation between performance on this test and
severity of motor symptoms [58]. *is suggests that the
proposed deﬁcit in emotion recognition is not an inherent
trait of PD, but rather a state-based epiphenomenon, with
performance on such tests likely reﬂecting their incidental
processing demands. Indeed, Bull et al. [59] found that
performance on the RMET test was disrupted when partic-
ipants were required to perform a secondary task involving
inhibitory processing. *is disruption was not witnessed
when the secondary task involved other executive functions,
namely, working memory or switching, nor when the task did
not require attribution of mental states. *us, this test’s
apparent reliance upon inhibitory processing may explain
why our PD patients were impaired on this test.
*e ﬁnding that there are only ToM deﬁcits in PD when
the ToM test places greater demand upon inhibition sup-
ports previous ﬁndings of a relationship between ToM
performance and executive function [8, 12]. For example,
Eddy et al. [60] also found that people with PD demon-
strated less impairment on ToM tests when the executive
load was reduced. Speciﬁcally, they found that performance
on longer, but not shorter, verbal tests of ToMwas associated
with verbal working memory. In contrast with the current
study, they argue that working memory and executive
functioning deﬁcits do not wholly explain ToM perfor-
mance. It is important to note, however, that they omitted to
include a measure of inhibition in this experiment. In an
additional experiment, they did include measures of in-
hibition but failed to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant group diﬀerences in
either inhibition or ToM, supporting the argument that
performance on these is intrinsically linked in PD.
Anderson et al. [61] also reported the preservation of
social cognition in PD, with poor performance tests of social
cognition only occurring in the context of greater executive
dysfunction.*ey propose that when faced with an everyday
social problem, people with PD may have greater diﬃculty
inhibiting any previously unsuccessful problem-solving
strategies, resulting in the generation of fewer viable alter-
natives and reliance upon prepotent responding. Our study
extends this ﬁnding to provide evidence that poor perfor-
mance on tests of ToM tests in PD is explained by deﬁcits in
inhibition. *e impact of executive load may also explain
why the PD patients also performed worse on the control
question within the ToM test. As the original [28] test was
modiﬁed to include three rather than two boxes, the control
question may have inadvertently become more challenging
and involve greater processing demands.
It is important to note that overall cognitive load can-
not account for the PD deﬁcits in the high inhibition
condition. *e most challenging subtest on our ToM test
appears to have been the true location test in the low in-
hibition condition, with both participant groups performing
signiﬁcantly worse on this subtest than in the high inhibition
condition. Yet, no signiﬁcant group diﬀerences were found
here, supporting the suggestion that it is the deﬁcits in
inhibition that lead to the PD-speciﬁc impairments on the
false belief task.
Our ﬁndings are in keeping with the known neuropa-
thology of PD. Studies have repeatedly shown that PD is
characterised by reductions in frontal lobe volume, meta-
bolism, and connectivity [62–64]. Frontal areas are known to
be critical for inhibition [65–67], with right frontal areas
particularly involved in the inhibition of one’s own perspective
[28, 68].*e frontal lobe is also thought to be involved in ToM
[69]. However, frontal lobe damage does not necessarily result
in impairments in ToM [20] and inhibition is increasingly
recognised as important for ToM [23, 24] and Doenyas et al.
[26].*erefore, we argue that our patients’ deﬁcits on our tests
of ToM may be explained by their impairments in inhibition
associated with the known frontal lobe damage in PD.
A limitation of our study is the small sample size. All
previous research using this methodology has been limited to
single cases or very small case series [27, 28, 39], and therefore,
although our patient group size is modest, we hope it will
provide a ﬁrst step towards larger patient group studies.
Future research may wish to expand upon our method-
ology to include a further control condition that would not
require the inference of a false belief, but rather assess the ability
to follow the object being moved. *is would provide a vig-
ilance control condition enabling better isolation of the cog-
nitive processes involved in the false belief task. However,
increasing the number of conditions would necessitate a longer
administration time and possibly increase testing fatigue.
In conclusion, this study shows that deﬁcits observed on
ToM tests in PDmay be explained by deﬁcits in inhibition. Poor
performance on these tests therefore does not indicate im-
pairment in social cognition, but more likely deﬁcits in man-
aging the complex processing demands that these tests involve.
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